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Abstract--In this paper, we prove .a necessary and sulllcient condition for an attainable allocation to 
be a Walrus (competitive) allocation, in a coalition-production economy with an infinite dimensional 
commodity space. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In this note, we give a characterization of Walras (competitive) allocations in an economy with 
a measure space of agents and an infinite dimensional commodity space. Our hypotheses are 
minimal. 
So let (C&E,p) b e a finite measure space representing the space of economic agents. Hence, 
E represents the collection of allowable coalitions and p(.) measures the size of each coalition. 
The idea of a measure space of agents, was first introduced by Aumann [l] as the appropriate 
device to overcome certain technical difficulties and establish the existence of equilibria in large 
economies. Also let X be a separable Banach space, representing the commodity space. In 
the last decade, the emphasis of the research in equilibrium theory has been on economies with 
an infinite dimensional commodity space. A comprehensive introduction to the subject can be 
found in the recent book of Aliprantis-Brown-Burkinshaw [2]. We are also given a multifunction 
F~fi-2~ - {8}, which assigns to each agent w E R, its consumption possibility set F(w). We 
will assume that our economy involves also production. So we are given a set-valued set function 
M : C --) 2x - {fl}, which for every coalition A E C, generates the set M(A) of all possible 
bundles produced by the coalition. For each agent w E R, we are given k=,, a complete preorder 
on its consumption set F(w). So &,, describes the preference relation (taste) of agent w E 52. 
As in [3], from kU, we can derive the strict preference relation +w and the indifference relation 
ww. To simplify our arguments, without any loss of generality, we will assume that the initial 
endowment wc(.) is identically 0. By a price vector, we will mean an element of the dual space 
X’. 
For this coalition-production economy, we will make the following general hypotheses, which 
are rather standard in models of this kind: 
H(1) w +ktw is a graph measurable multifunction (i.e., Gr+ {(w,z, y) : y k;w z) E C x 
B(X x X) = c x B(X) x B(X), with B(X x X) (resp. B(X)) being the Bore1 o-field of 
X x X (resp. of X); & is p a.e. locally nonsatia?d on F(e) (i.e., for w E R - N,,u(N) = 0 
and z E F(w), given c > 0, we can find t’ E BE(z) = {z E X : 11% - 211 < 6) s.t. x’ E 
F(w) and x’ >w x). Intuitively, this means that for /.4most all agents, given a feasible 
consumption bundle, we can find arbitrarily close to it another feasible consumption bundle 
which is strictly preferred to the first. 
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H(2) F : 0 - Zx{S} is a graph measurable multifunction (i.e., Gr F = {(w, z) E R x X : z E 
F(w)} E C x B(X)). 
H(3) M : C - 2x{0} is a weak set-valued measure (i.e., for every z* E X’, A -+ u(t*, M(A)) = 
SUP{(Z*,Z) : 2 E M(A)} is a signed measure), which admits a weak set-valued Radon- 
Nikodym derivative (i.e., there exists a graph measurable multifunction G : R + 2x{0} 
s.t. for every z* E X’, Q(z*, M(A)) = JA c(z*, G(w)) dp(w)). 
Recall (see [4]), that the density function u(z*, G(.)), is called the “profit-function” and is 
determined by u(t*, M(.)) up to p a.e. equivalence. Detailed mathematical conditions under 
which hypothesis H(3) above holds, can be found in [5-71. 
Following [3], an allocation is an element of the set Sk = {f E L’(X) : f(w) E F(w) p- a.e.}. 
Here, L’(X) is the Lebesgue-Bochner space of all equivalence classes of measurable functions 
f : f-2 + x f3.t. s, Ilf@)ll+(~) < co. An allocation f E Sk is said to be “attainable” if and 
only if Jn f(w) Mu) E M(Q) (’ i.e., there exists v E M(R) s.t. v = Jn f(w) dp(w)). Recall that 
we have assumed that the initial endowment is identically zero. So for an attainable allocation, 
we have that total consumption equals total production. Given a price system z* E X’ - {0}, 
we will say that an attainable allocation f, is a “Walras” (or “competitive at z*“) allocation if: 
(i) g(w) +-w f(w)p a.e. + (z*,g(w)) > u(z*,G(u))p a.e. on the sets in C (i.e., any strictly 
preferred allocation exceeds the budget). 
(ii) (z+, f(w)) 5 u(z*,G(u))p a.e. (i.e., the Walras allocation is within the budget limits). 
(iii) (z*, Jn f(w) &G)) = Jn 4~‘~ G(w)) 44~). 
Note that in (ii), we actually have p a.e. equality because, if the inequality was strict on 
A E C, ~(-4) > O, then clearly (I’, & f(w) 44~)) = j&z*, f(w)) 44~) < sn 4~*, G(w)) 44wh 
contradicting part (iii). 
Now we will introduce the concept of a “blocking at z* coalition.” So A E C, with p(A) > 0, 
blocks the attainable allocation f E Sk at the price system z* E X’ - {0}, if there exists an 
allocation g E S$ s.t. 
(i)’ g(w) kU f(w)p A a.e. and g(w) +w f(w) for every w E B s A, p(B) > 0, 
(ii)’ (z*, IA g(w) do) 5 JA 4x*, G(w)) do. 
So the non-null coalition A E C, by its own means evaluated at the prevailing price system, 
can come up with a better outcome of the production process. 
Hence, an attainable allocation f is “unblocked at t*” if and only if for any g E Si satisfying 
g(w) :w f(w) fJ a.e. on A E C and g(w) +w f(w) f or w E B G A, p(B) > 0, we have 
J, u(z*, G(w)) dp(w) < (z*, J, g(w) dp(w)). Intuitively this means that any allocation which 
within a nontrivial coalition produces a better outcome than f(e) is outside the budget limits 
determined by the price system x*. 
2. WALRAS ALLOCATIONS 
In this section, we state and prove a theorem that completely characterizes Walras allocations 
(see Section 1). 
THEOREM. If hypotheses H(l), H(2) and H(3) hold, then an attainable allocation f E S$ is 
Walras (competitive) at z* E X’ - (0) if and only if is unblocked at z* E X’ - (0). 
PROOF. U Suppose that there exists B E C, p(B) > 0 s.t. it blocks attainable allocation f at z*. 
Then by definition there exists g E Sk s.t. 
and g(w) k.w f(w)p~ a.e., with g(w) & f(w) for all w E C c B, p(C) > 0. 
Since, by hypothesis, f(e) is a Walras allocation at z* E X* - {0}, we have 
4x*, G(w)) < tx*, g(w)) for all w E C. 
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Let D = {w E 0 : a(z*,G(w)) 5 (z*,g(w))}. Then D E C, D _> C and so p(D) > 0. Let 
E = B - D. Our claim is that E is p-null. Suppose not. Then for w E E, let 
RI(W)= {z E F(w):2 +w f(w)} # 0(byl oca nonsatiation; see hypothesis H(l)), 1 
Rz(w) = &(/(w)) = {z E X : 112 - f(w)11 < c}, 6 > 0, 
Rs(w) = {z E X :(x*,2) < u(z*,G(w))}. 
Then we have GrR1 = {(w,z) E E x X : p(w,z) E Gr(+)} n G~FIE, where ‘p : E x 
X -+ E x X x X is defined by cp(w , z) = (w , z, f(w)). Clearly, (p( ., .) is measurable, while 
Gr(+) E CE x B(X) x B(X), since by hypothesis H(l), w -kU is graph measurable, hence, 
soisw ++w. Therefore, {(w, z) E E x X : cp(w, z) E Gr( +)} E & x B(X). Also note that 
Gr F]E E CE x B(X), since by hypothesis H(2), F(e) is a graph measurable multifunction. Thus, 
we deduce that 
GrRl E CE x B(X), (2) 
where CE = C fl E, the trace of the r-field C on E. 
Next note that GrRz = {(w,L) E E x X : (p(w,z) < E}, where cp(w,z) = 11% - f(w)ll. 
Clearly, (o(., .) is a Caratheodory function (i.e., cp(w,z) is measurable in omega and continuous 
in z), thus jointly measurable. Therefore, 
Gr R~ECE x B(X). (3) 
Finally, we have Gr R3 = {(w,r) E E x X : qp(w,a) < 0), where ~=*(w,z) = (z’,z) - 
u(E*, G(w)). Clearly, nz= (., .) is a Caratheodory function, hence jointly measurable. Therefore, 
we have 
Gr RBECE x B(X). (4 
Set R(w) = ifil R+(w), w E E. From (2), (3) and (4) above, we deduce 
Gr RECE x B(X). 
Apply Aumann’s selection theorem (see [8, Theorem 5.101) to get g : E + X measurable s.t. 
g(w) E R(w) p a.e. Set g = gxE + fXEC. Clearly, j E Sk and i(W) k-w g(W)PE a-e., p(E) > 0, 
while (z*,g(w)) < a(z*,G(w))p~- a.e., a contradiction to the hypothesis that f(e) is a Walrus 
allocation at c*. So p(E) = 0. Therefore, we have 
Q(z*, G(w)) I (2’) g(w)) PB a.e- 
with strict inequality on C E B, p(C) > 0. So 
J 4~*, G(w)) 444 = 
B 
which contradicts (1). 
Therefore, we conclude that f E Sk is unblocked at t* E X*(O). 
$: First, we claim that for all b E II, we have 
Suppose not. Then there exists B E C, p(B) > 0 s.t. 
0<6= / u(z* 9 G(w)) d/+4 - I(%* 1 f(w)) 4-4~). 
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As in the first part of the proof, for w E B, let 
RI(W) = {z E F(w) : .z h f(w)) 
and 
0 
Rz(w) = &V(w)), with E = 
6 
Il~‘llcl(B)’ 
Then by the local nonsatiation hypothesis R’(w) = R~(w)f~Rz(w) # 0 and we have already seen 
earlier that Gr R’ E Cg x B(X). Apply Aumann’s selection theorem, to get g : B + X measurable 
s.t. g(w) E R’(w) pLg a.e. Set 3 = 5’; i(w) kw f(w) /J a.e., i(w) &, f(w), w E B, p(B) > 0 and 
from the choice of 6 > 0, we also have that J’,(z*, j(w)) tip(w) 5 se u(c*, G(w)) c+(w) =P coalition 
B E C, p(B) > 0 blocks f E Sh at z*, a contradiction to our hypothesis. 
Therefore, for every B E C, we have 
J (~*,f(W))44w) = J u(t* , G(w)) dp(w) =+ (z*, f(w)) = u(t*, G(w)) p a.e. (5) 
B B 
Next let g E L’(X) and suppose that g(w) +w f(w)p~ a.e., p(B) > 0 and (t*,g(w)) 2 
u(z*, G(w))~B a.e. + JB(z*, g(w)) C+(W) < JB u(z*, G(w)) dl~(w) * coalition B E C blocks f at 
x’, a contradiction to our hypothesis. 
So “if g(w) & f(w)pB a.e., p(B) > 0 + u(x*,G(w)) < (z*,g(w)) PB 8.e.” (6) 
Finally, if (2’) Jn f(w) 44~)) < Jn 4x*, G(w)) 4.4~) * j&x*, f(w)) 44~) < .&n 4x*, G(w)) 
c@(w)), a contradiction to (5). Therefore, 
(+4444) =~(~*J(4)444=i(+..G(w))d,c(4. (7) 
From (5), (6) and (7) above, we get that f E Sy is a Walras (competitive) allocation at 
x* E x*- (0). 
REMARK. If X = llV , from Theorem 1 of [3], we know 
allocation. So we have just proved that every unblocked 
allocation (i.e., Pareto optimal). 
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